Introduction
For many years, the Irish courts have operated one of the strictest exclusionary rules in relation to improperly obtained evidence in the common law world. Where evidence is obtained in breach of the constitutional rights of a suspect it is subject to automatic exclusion at trial, unless there are in existence extraordinary excusing circumstances justifying its admission [22, 25, 14 and 31] . This strict rule has also been employed by the courts to exclude from trial derivative evidence which is causatively linked to an earlier breach of constitutional rights -what the Americans term the -fruit of the poisoned tree‖.
Unlike their American counterparts, however, the Irish judiciary have established and continue to operate this rule not on the principle of deterrence, but on the basis of protectionism. The main rationale for the strict exclusionary rule in relation to unconstitutionally obtained evidence in Ireland is the constitutional imperative to protect the rights of the individual and to endeavour to vindicate such rights in the event of violation [5, 11, 21 and 20] . Yet while the stated rationale may be protectionist, rather than preventative, the decisions of the courts in excluding evidence obtained in breach of constitutional rights inherently impact on the Garda 2 Síochána (the Irish police force) and lead to modifications in the behaviour of gardaí, particularly in terms of how they investigate crimes and gather evidence.
The strictness and rigidity of the Irish exclsuionary rule, however, has been criticised both on and off the judicial benches and calls for change have emanated from many quarters. In January 2010 the Irish Supreme Court gave its decision in the case of DPP (Walsh) 
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Different jurisdictions have adopted differing rules in relation to the admission or exclusion of improperly obtained evidence. In England and Wales, for example, the common law allowed for the admission of all evidence, no matter how it was obtained. This was subject to a discretion to exclude evidence which was obtained oppressively, improperly or unfairly, 2 or as a result of the activities of an agent provocateur [17] . 3 The discretion was rarely exercised, however, and, generally, if tendered evidence was relevant it was admitted despite the manner in which it was obtained. have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. However, this provision has been narrowly interpreted by the appellate courts, with the effect that the central basis for exclusion is unreliability due to the manner in which the impugned evidence was obtained. Thus exclusion usually occurs only in the context of confession evidence [2] . Generally, the introduction of section 78 has not led to a significant change in the approach of the courts of England and
Wales to the admission of improperly obtained evidence, which is more often admitted than excluded. 5 In the United States, as noted above, evidence improperly obtained will only be excluded from trial where there is some deterrent value in exclusion [16 and 13] . In relation to evidence obtained in breach of legal rights only, the trial judge holds a discretion to exclude or admit the evidence, and
In relation to evidence obtained in breach of constitutionally protected rights, the trial judge has no discretion -he must exclude the evidence on account of the breach, unless there are extraordinary excusing circumstances 13 in existence which would justify its admission; in which case, admission or exclusion is a matter for the discretion of the trial judge.
Since then, although decided on a case-by-case basis, the Irish courts have generally favoured the admission of evidence in the first category, i.e. evidence obtained in breach of mere legal rights. Usually, such evidence will only be excluded where there has been a repeated breach of legal rights, or several cumulative breaches of legal rights. 14 In relation to the exercise of judicial discretion in this area, Hogan has suggested that the courts, in practice, almost always recognise some reason allowing for the admission of illegally obtained evidence in the overall public interest. 15 The rule in relation to unconstitutionally obtained evidence, however, has emerged as the more interesting subject area and has given rise to more extensive debate and significant case-law over the years since 1965. As set out below, this rule does not allow for any judicial balancing of varying factors or considerations in a given case and its controlling rationale is the protection of individual rights. Under this regime, deterrence of police misconduct is simply an indirect by-product of the stricter protectionist rationale.
Following the Supreme Court decision in O'Brien, the courts began to explore the ambit and application of the exclusionary rule which had been formulated therein.
While it had been applied to items of real evidence in O'Brien, it was applied to confession evidence for the first time in
Reports 336 where a confession had been obtained from the suspect during a period of unlawful detention, in breach of his constitutional right to liberty. This case was significant, not only because it showed that the rule was applicable to confession evidence, but also because it was held that the impugned evidence had to be excluded even though the gardaí were acting in good faith, i.e. to secure the confession and thereafter the conviction of the suspect. Therefore, no mala fides (bad faith) needs to be shown in order for the exclusionary rule to be invoked. The phrase -deliberate and conscious violation‖ generated some confusion and discussion in later cases and analyses. 16 Did this mean that the relevant gardaí must have known that they were breaching suspect rights at the relevant time in order for the evidence obtained in that manner to be excluded at trial? If so, the rule would operate in a manner similar to that adopted in the United States and would only exclude evidence where there was a deterrent value. Alternatively, perhaps the phrase meant that where deliberate and conscious acts of the gardaí led to the breach of constitutional rights, evidence so obtained would be excluded even if the relevant gardaí did not realise that a breach of constitutional rights was occurring. As the knowledge of the police in this instance would be irrelevant, such a rule would be protectionist rather than deterrent in nature.
Ultimately it was this latter construction of the rule which found favour and was involved an invalid search warrant. However, unlike O'Brien, the invalidity was not apparent on the face of the warrant. At trial, it was held that there was no legal authority in the warrant as it had been issued by a peace commissioner without any evidence that he himself had been satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for the suspicion held by the member of the Garda Síochána who swore information before him. 17 As the legal defect in the warrant was not clear on its face, the gardaí who had purported to execute it at the dwelling of the suspect had not been in any way aware that they were breaching his constitutional right to the inviolability of his dwelling. It was acknowledged by the Chief Justice that setting the bar of exclusion at this level would lead to the loss of relevant evidence in criminal prosecutions, but he held that
[T]he detection of crime and the conviction of guilty persons, no matter how important they may be to the ordering of society, cannot … outweigh the unambiguously expressed constitutional obligation ‗as far as practicable to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen ' [1990] However, the Chairman of the Group, Dr Gerard Hogan SC, dissented in relation to this recommendation for change and expressed the view that:
Our society has committed itself to abiding by the rule of law and to respect and vindicate the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. It behoves us to take these rights and freedoms seriously and if the occasional 19 In Kenny, the actions of the Gardaí in obtaining the warrant and later forcibly entering the dwelling could not be said to be unintentional or accidental and, although the Gardaí concerned had no knowledge that they were invading the constitutional rights of the appellant, the evidence ought not to have been admitted at trial. 20 The most significant example of this is the judgment of Charleton J in the High Court in DPP (Walsh) This statement depicts the current protectionist stance of Irish law in this area and, In order for confession evidence to be excluded as -fruit of the poisoned tree‖, i.e.
where the confession is connected to an earlier, related breach of constitutional rights, there must be an ongoing causative link in place. If the violation of rights has in some way been remedied prior to the making of inculpatory statements, then there is no requirement that such statements should be excluded at trial. This is clear from the In Buck, the suspect was arrested on a Sunday morning and, due to the holding of a major sporting event in the locality, the gardaí were unable to contact a solicitor, as requested by the detained suspect. It was found as a fact that the gardaí had at all times acted bona fide (in good faith) in their efforts to secure a solicitor for the suspect. Despite not securing a solicitor, the gardaí went ahead and questioned the suspect. 21 He, however, made no statements until later in the day following the eventual arrival of a solicitor and advice received from him.
The argument raised at trial and on appeal was that the statements made by the accused ought to have been excluded as there had been a breach of his constitutionally protected right of access to pre-trial legal advice. 22 It was held, however, that the statements made by the suspect were admissible in evidence as there had been no conscious and deliberate breach of his constitutional rights. It was also suggested that even if there had been a breach, a causative link between such breach and the making of any statement by the suspect would have to be shown before the statement would be excluded from evidence at trial.
Following Buck, the case of O'Brien arose wherein the gardaí were found to have acted mala fides in their efforts to secure a solicitor for the suspect to the extent that they had consciously and deliberately breached his constitutional right of access to legal advice in the pre-trial process. In this case, the suspect made statements to the gardaí both before and after eventual consultation with his solicitor. It was held by 21 Unlike the position in England and Wales whereby a detained suspect who requests legal advice cannot be interviewed until he has received such advice [29; para 6.6], there is no prohibition on the questioning of a suspect in Ireland prior to the arrival of a requested solicitor. was ongoing had to be excluded from evidence at trial due to that breach, but that the second set of statements could be admitted in evidence as the breach was no longer ongoing at the time when those statements were made and there was no causative link between the breach and the making of the statements [11] .
While there seemed to The jurisprudence in this area has centred on evidence obtained post-arrest which is later sought to be produced against the accused at trial. The Cash case, however, presented a somewhat different set of circumstances as it concerned evidence obtained prior to arrest which was not itself produced at trial. The accused in this case, John Cash, had been arrested on suspicion of burglary on a certain date several years prior to the instant proceedings. During a period of detention subsequent to that arrest his fingerprints were taken. It was unclear whether statutory powers to take fingerprints were exercised [6; section 6] or whether the suspect consented to the taking of fingerprints, which would not require the statutory mechanism to be invoked. 23 The case against Mr. Cash at that time was not pursued and, accordingly, his fingerprints ought to have been destroyed had they been obtained under the statutory regime. 24 No such destruction requirement exists where fingerprints are taken by consent. 25 Mr. Cash's fingerprints were not destroyed; they were retained in the Garda Technical Bureau.
D.P.P.(Walsh) v Cash
The instant proceedings began with a burglary at a premises and the taking of fingerprints at the crime scene. These prints were run through the fingerprint database at the Garda Technical Bureau and matched with the prints taken earlier from Mr.
Cash. Mr. Cash was arrested and detained on suspicion of burglary. During this period of detention a second set of prints was obtained from him, by consent. 26 He was then charged with the offence and subsequently convicted.
Questions arose as to the status of the first set of fingerprints, which gave rise to the second arrest and ultimately to the taking of a second set of prints. The accused's defence team argued that the prosecution had failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the first set of prints had been legally retained and further argued on that basis that the evidence flowing from such prints ought to have been excluded at trial. Act, 1996 and any copies thereof must be destroyed at the expiration of 12 months from the taking of such prints if proceedings are not instituted against the relevant suspect and the failure to institute the proceedings within that period is not due to the fact that he has absconded or cannot be found. 25 The Law Reform Commission [18; para 4.09] has noted that in practice where assurances are given by the gardaí that fingerprints will not be retained or where a volunteer requests that his prints be destroyed, then they are destroyed. 26 Written consent was given by the suspect's mother as the suspect was at the time under 18 years of age.
Both the High Court and the Supreme Court viewed the law on arrest as central to the appeal in Cash and held that the exclusionary rule from Kenny is only applicable to evidence sought to be presented in a criminal trial, and has no role in relation to evidence used to ground a reasonable suspicion for an arrest. In the High Court Charleton J, dismissing the appeal, held that evidence resulting from a detention based upon a suspicion that cannot be proved as being founded entirely upon evidence lawfully obtained is not, for that reason, made unlawful [2007] IEHC 108 at para 68.
As he recognised no unlawfulness, the learned judge rejected the contention that the exclusionary rule was applicable on the facts of this case. However, he took the opportunity presented by the case to express his negative view of that rule in quite forceful terms:
[a] rule which remorselessly excludes evidence obtained through an illegality occurring by a mistake does not commend itself to the proper ordering of society which is the purpose of the criminal law [2007] IEHC 108 at para 65.
Charleton J considered that the decision whether or not to exclude evidence at trial should be based on a balancing of the interests of society as against the interests of the accused, taking into account the rights of the victim.
Given the strong opinion expressed by Charleton J in the High Court, it was thought that the Supreme Court might also avail of the opportunity to address the operation of the exclusionary rule and, perhaps, to reinterpret it in a less stringent manner. This did not occur. Instead, the Supreme Court, like Charleton J, held that the exclusionary rule was not applicable and dismissed the appeal. While it did not substantively address the content or operation of the rule, the decision of the seven-judge Supreme Court in Cash is of much significance to the law in this area and, indeed, to police investigations in the future. The Court may have thought itself to be neatly sidestepping the sticky issue of exclusion, but, it may in fact have caused more harm than good in so doing. Giving the decision of the Court, Fennelly J 27 stated that the main issue for consideration in Cash was whether 27 Murray CJ, Denham, Geoghegan, Macken, and Finnegan JJ concurring. Hardiman J delivered a separate judgment in which he lamented the lack of evidence in relation to any unconstitutionality in the retention of the first set of fingerprints and accordingly held that the matter would have to be remitted to the District Court and none of the questions which appeared to be raised could be answered.
the absolute exclusionary rule laid down in Kenny should be extended to cover facts, not being offered as part of the evidence at a criminal trial, but giving rise to the suspicion which led to the arrest.
[2010] IESC 1 at para 24.
He went on to hold that this rule is only relevant to the exclusion of evidence Cash, the rationale of the Irish exclusionary rule would surely be altered as deterrence would seem to take precedence over protectionism, with exclusion being based on garda intention rather than on the protection of rights. In any event, on the basis of Cash one could argue that even in such a hypothetical scenario the courts would not be concerned with the manner in which the evidence used to ground the arrest was obtained.
Conclusion
It will take some time for the decision in Cash to fully permeate Irish jurisprudence in relation to the exclusion of evidence and for further applications of the view expressed therein to occur. Perhaps the true remit of the decision will only be clear at that point.
At this point in time, the judgment can be viewed as most worrying in terms of the protection of rights in the criminal process and the judicial oversight of policing. It is submitted that it might have been better for the protection and vindication of rights if the Supreme Court had addressed the ongoing application of the strict exclusionary rule in this case and decided, for example, to apply the rule but to find that there were extraordinary excusing circumstances in existence in this case justifying admission.
Even if the Supreme Court had considered that the strict rule ought to be altered and should now only be applied in circumstances of intentional, knowing breach by the gardaí, thus perhaps not applying in this case and adopting a new deterrent rationale, it might have been better. To hold, as the Court did instead, that the exclusionary rule has no application in relation to pre-arrest impropriety is most dangerous. Clearly, if a case does not come to trial, the courts have no ability to control or question investigative techniques and any improprieties would fall to be dealt with through garda discipline or by way of civil actions. However, when a case does come before the courts, they ought not to turn a blind eye to the investigative stage and consider only whatever evidence is proffered at trial. In fact, even considering only the evidence presented at trial, Cash ought arguably to have been otherwise decided given that the evidence presented at trial could still be traced back to potentially unconstitutionally retained evidence, i.e. the original fingerprints whose -lawful provenance‖ could not be established by the prosecution. While this author supports the continuing application of a strict exclusionary rule in relation to unconstitutionally obtained evidence in Ireland which both vindicates constitutional rights and directs police practices, this ought not to give rise to obscure jurisprudence which is potentially based on a desire to circumvent discussion or reinterpretation of that rule. The application of a less strict, discretion-oriented 21 balancing test would, in the absence of any stronger protection for rights within the criminal process, be better than nothing at all. It would also mean that, unlike the effects of the Cash decision, the courts could look at, discuss and consider the constitutionality, legality and fairness of pre-arrest policing techniques, which must surely be viewed as an appropriate and necessary aspect of the judicial oversight of policing. This is not to suggest that evidence grounding an arrest ought to meet the evidential and procedural requirements of evidence proffered at trial, but merely to allow the courts to hold gardaí, as agents of the state, accountable for breaches of rights (primarily constitutional rights, but legal rights also) at whatever stage of the criminal process they occur.
